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Small Island Developing States (SIDS) are usually left out in the aid effectiveness literature, 
despite being among the poorest and top receivers of foreign aid. This paper tests the main 
conditionality models of the literature and specifies a new model that best fit the data for 37 
SIDS. The general finding is that aid has a positive and significant effect on growth. 
However, we do not find supporting evidence for the good policies conditionality or the 
existence of diminishing returns. Instead, we find that aid works best in the presence of 
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Over the last several decades, Small Island Developing States (SIDS) have tended to receive 
much more development aid, relative to size, than other developing countries. Whether this is 
due to their small size, increased need due to vulnerability, or strong geographical ties to 
various donor countries, these countries regularly rank among the world’s largest relative aid 
recipients. In 2008, they made up almost half of the world’s top 20 recipients of Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) as a percentage of GNI, with several well in excess of 30 per 
cent.1 Despite this, growth remains low in many of these countries, and development is poor.  
 
Although the aid effectiveness literature is increasingly comprehensive, SIDS are largely 
absent from most studies, due largely to a simple lack of comprehensive and reliable data. 
These omissions lead one to question whether the relationships found in the literature hold 
true in these countries. This is further brought into question by these countries’ defining 
characteristics, which make them a distinct and substantively different subset of the world’s 
developing countries, allowing for the possibility that they may also differ in terms of drivers 
of growth and aid effectiveness. The aim of this paper is to analyse the effectiveness of 
development aid in Small Island Developing States by building upon the empirical 
techniques used in the existing literature and applying them to a SIDS dataset.2 
 
The importance of understanding aid effectiveness is clear. Strong results indicating success 
or failure of development aid, or the conditions under which it can be successful or wasteful, 
will help in optimizing both the quantity and quality of aid spending. Global ODA spending, 
the measure of aid generally used by the literature, exceeded 128 billion US dollars in 2008, 
and is generally increasing over time. On the other hand, relative aid levels are not 
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increasing, with many countries, and the developed world as a whole, falling well short of the 
0.7 per cent of GDP commitment made by developed nations at various times in recent 
decades. Both the large absolute sums, and the small relative amounts, are politically 
contentious, and a lack of clear results regarding aid effectiveness is surely one of the major 
obstacles to rectifying this.  
 
In keeping with the traditions of the existing literature, we focus on the effects of Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) on growth rates of real per capita GDP. ODA is defined 
broadly by the OECD Development Assistance Committee as aid meeting certain conditions 
and with the goal of ‘the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing 
countries’.3 While clearly such a narrow dependent variable is an imperfect measure of the 
success of ODA, we are unfortunately restricted to its use as long as there does not exist a 
measure, or set of measures, that fully encompass and accurately gauge the outcomes of 
development aid, and for which data are available.4 As such, we must be careful in framing 
the results accordingly, rather than attempting to draw the grand conclusions that some 
previous papers have suggested. 
 
Our empirical analysis yields interesting findings. Most importantly, we find that ODA 
appears to have a significant and positive effect on growth, although this is not robust to all 
specifications and tests. We also find that ODA appears to be more effective in the presence 
of high quality public institutions and political structures. This result differs from much of the 
literature, but is generally found to be quite robust within our dataset. We also note that we 
find little, if any, evidence for other prominent results, including diminishing returns to aid, 




The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 will give a brief survey of the existing aid 
effectiveness literature, and Section 3 will outline our data selection and empirical methods. 
The heart of the paper is the application of prominent aid-growth models to the SIDS dataset, 
results of which are found in Section 4, along with the development of a preferred 
specification and general results. Finally, we discuss several brief conclusions drawn from 
the results of these models.  
2. Existing Literature 
 
The Aid-Growth Literature 
 
The body of literature dealing with aid effectiveness is large and growing, particularly over 
the last decade. Several studies provide comprehensive reviews of the literature, including 
Doucouliagos and Paldam (2006, 2009, 2010) and Hansen and Tarp (2000). Here, we focus 
only on the literature most relevant to this study, namely the so called (and closely related) 
‘Direct Growth’ and ‘Conditional Growth’ families (Doucouliagos and Paldam; 2006, 2009, 
2010). 
 
As these names suggest, the former focuses on testing the effect of aid on growth directly, 
rather than by testing its effect on savings and investment as in earlier works, while the latter 
tests for particular circumstances or recipient country characteristics that determine the 
effectiveness of aid. The basis of direct growth models is generally estimation of a growth 
equation of the form  
݃௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅  ߤ݄௜௧ ൅ ෍ߛ௝ݔ௝௜௧ ൅ ݑ௜௧ 
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where git is the dependent variable, generally per capita GDP growth in country i and time t, 
α is a constant or fixed effect, hit is aid as a percentage of GNI, and xj represents any number 
of other variables thought to drive growth, indexed by j. The coefficients to be estimated are 
given by α, μ and γ. Closely related are the conditional growth models, which add a condition 
variable, given by zit with coefficient δ, and an interaction term, simply aid multiplied by the 
condition variable giving hitzit with coefficient ω, as follows: 
 
݃௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅  ߤ݄௜௧ ൅ ߜݖ௜௧ ൅ ݄߱௜௧ݖ௜௧ ൅෍ߛ௝ݔ௝௜௧ ൅ ݑ௜௧ 
 
While direct growth models determine aid effectiveness with significant results of the μ 
coefficient, conditionality models additionally look for significance in the ω coefficient, 
which suggests aid is more or less effective when the condition variable zit is large. It is these 
two model types that we focus on in this review and adapt in the following sections for our 
own analysis of aid effectiveness. 
 
Rajan and Subramanian (2008) identify variables common to a number of more prominent 
papers: initial level of per capita income, measures of institutional and policy quality, 
financial depth or development (generally measured by ratio of money supply M2 to GDP), 
inflation, a measure of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, assassinations (as a proxy for 
political and social stability), and ratio of government budget balance to GDP. If not already 
included as part of a combined policy variable, openness to trade is also generally used, often 
along with regional dummies, population and population growth rates, and human capital 
measures such as schooling rates.  
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The first major addition to this basic model is the so called ‘medicine model’ approach, 
which includes an aid squared variable, to determine whether there are increasing or 
decreasing returns to aid.5 The general finding is that while aid has a positive effect, it has 
decreasing returns, and an upper threshold above which additional aid is not beneficial. 
Wagner (2008) extends this model, using nonlinear estimation to find both lower and upper 
thresholds, between which aid is most effective. Despite such prominence in the literature, 
however, Doucouliagos and Paldam’s (2009) meta-analysis finds that there is no real 
evidence for the significance of the aid-squared term, be it positive or negative, particularly 
when taking into account a prevalent publication bias, which they find significantly biases 
results towards negative aid-squared coefficients. 
 
Two more variables that have been used extensively as conditions for the effectiveness of aid, 
sometimes together, are those measuring governmental policy and those measuring 
institutional quality. For use in this manner, Burnside and Dollar (2000) derives a variable 
representing ‘good’ economic policy (a weighted mean of inflation, budget balance, and 
openness to trade), finding that the aid coefficient is insignificant, while the aid * policy 
interaction coefficient is positive and significant, leading to the conclusion that aid is 
generally ineffective in bad policy environments, but effective in good policy environments. 
Elegant and intuitively appealing, with strong policy implications, these results have been the 
focus of much policy debate, political rhetoric, and repeated development and retesting. 
 
A decade after its initial publication, the policy conditionality model is still being tested with 
varying results, most notably by Easterly, Levine, and Roodman (2004), as well as Hansen, 
Tarp, and Dalgaard (2000; 2001; 2004), Dayton-Johnson and Hoddinott (2003), and others.6 
While Burnside and Dollar (2004; 2004b) have defended the hypothesis, Doucouliagos and 
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Paldam (2010) find in meta-analysis that while there is a clear negative relationship between 
coefficients of aid and aid * policy, but overall evidence for the good policy model is weak, 
with only a quarter of papers finding a positive and significant aid * policy coefficient. 
Further, the papers that do support the hypothesis in this way are seen to tend towards smaller 
sample sizes and thus higher variance and less trustworthy results (Doucouliagos and Paldam, 
2010). 
 
Other variables which have been used as conditions include exogenous vulnerability to 
climactic, economic, and demographic shocks (Guillaumont and Chauvet, 2001), political 
instability (Chauvet and Guillaumont, 2004), democratization (Kosack, 2003), and savings 
(Teboul and Moustier, 2001), although none are used in this study, generally due to lack of 
suitable data. 
 
A number of papers have included a measure of favourable geography, including Chervin 
and van Wijnbergen (2010), Bosworth and Collins (2003), Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani 
(2004), Sachs (2001; 2003), and Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp (2004), each finding geography 
to be significant either on its own or as a condition for aid effectiveness. However, while the 
preferred geographical measures - percentage of land in the tropics, and number of frost days 
per year - may have significant implications for growth in SIDS, they are unusable here, with 
the former effectively being a dummy variable taking the value of one for Bahrain and the 
Bahamas, and the latter unavailable for our dataset. 
 
Other notable areas of testing, beyond the scope of this paper, include comparing 
nongovernmental and bilateral aid (Masud and Yontcheva; 2005) and comparing tied and 
untied aid (Jelovac and Vandeninden, 2008; Cordella and Dell’Ariccia, 2007; Hefeker, 2005; 
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Miquel-Florensa, 2007). Burnside and Dollar (2000), Collier and Dollar (2001), and Kenny 
(2006), amongst others, go beyond testing aid effectiveness to determine guidelines for 
optimal aid allocation. Moe (2008), McGillivray and Noorbakhsh (2004), Williamson (2007), 
Kosack (2003) and Gomanee, Girma, and Morrissey (2003) provide examples of the growing 
use of HDI and other non-GDP welfare indicators as the dependent variable. Finally, and 
perhaps most interestingly with regards to future study, is Wagner’s (2008) use of partially 
nonlinear estimation techniques which give detailed insights into the changing effects of aid 
at differing levels. 
 
Small Island Developing States in the Literature 
The literature surrounding aid effectiveness in Small Island Developing States has, until 
recently, been near non-existent.7 Most closely related to this paper is a recent study by Feeny 
and McGillivray (2010), which also extends some of the general methods of the aid 
effectiveness literature to Small Island Developing States, and finds that aid is somewhat 
effective but with diminishing returns. We test their result with a larger data set and alternate 
methods bridging gaps to the existing literature in areas where they have diverged.  Our 
significantly different results outline some of the weaknesses in the methods of the aid-
growth literature, such as apparent sensitivity to choices of data and econometric techniques. 
Such comparisons have formed the basis and driven the development of the aid-growth 




Many of the major decisions regarding data, including the dimensions of the panel, are made 
by data availability. The full set covers the years 1980 to 2008 and the 37 SIDS which have 
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both received ODA over this period and for which enough reliable data is available for their 
inclusion. We use annual series and 4-year aggregates where appropriate.8 One criticism we 
wish to make of the existing literature is the method with which countries are selected. While 
it is clearly an admirable goal to include only countries below some wealth or development 
threshold, for those are the countries in whose development we are most interested, it appears 
that much of the literature makes this selection based only on current wealth. This generally 
excludes countries that were at one time as poor as some included countries, but whose 
growth moved them above the current threshold. Removing the ‘success stories’ in such a 
way can significantly alter our results. To combat this, we include in the full set all country-
years in which ODA was received, and test using both the full set and sets including only 
country-years for which per capita GDP is below some threshold.9 
 
 We include countries for which data is available (and appropriate) for all or part of the time 
period, and as such our panel is somewhat unbalanced.10 The full list of included SIDS is 
available in Table A1 in the appendix. Further data and variable choices are generally made 
by availability and an interest in comparability with existing literature. Many of our data are 
sourced from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, with a full list of sources 
given in Table A2 in the appendix. 
 
In some cases, for both testing purposes and necessity, we diverge from the literature, such as 
the availability-forced exclusion of budget surplus from the Burnside and Dollar (2000) style 
policy variable. Similarly, we use total trade as a percentage of GDP in place of the Sachs-
Warner coefficient, which appears to have fallen out of use. While these changes are not ideal 
from a comparability standpoint, there is no satisfactory alternative given data availability. 
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In keeping with much of the later literature, we have shied away from many self-constructed 
policy and institution variables which have been discarded in favour of increasingly available 
catch-all variables, such as those created for the World Bank by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido 
(referred to here as KKZ, 1999). The arithmetic mean of the six KKZ variables has become 
of increasing use in the literature, as a broad measure of the quality of public institutions. We 
also use the constituent parts individually where appropriate, often as replacements for 
similar but unavailable variables. In particular, the KKZ Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence measure makes an acceptable replacement for a measure of assassinations that is 
widely used but unavailable for many of our countries.11 Similarly, KKZ Voice and 
Accountability provides a suitably similar replacement for measures of democracy used in 
some studies. The World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) 
variables, while attractive, are unavailable for too many of our countries and periods to be of 
use. 
 
One important note is the manner in which we treat variables such as KKZ and linguistic 
fractionalization, which have short histories and are not available annually. Here we keep 
with standard practice, which has been to use the earliest available value as a proxy for earlier 
missing values, justified on the basis that the real values of these variables do not change 
much over time. For linguistic fractionalization, which is only available as time-invariant 
cross-sectional data, this means treating it as a constant. While we continue these practices 
out of necessity, it is worth nothing that it is not ideal, particularly given the collinearity 
effects it causes. This is particularly noticeable in fixed effects and GMM estimations, from 
which these variables often need to be excluded. Table A2 provides a full list of variables 
used, their interpretations, and sources. 
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3.2 Econometric Techniques 
 
We follow the literature to estimate the linear model of the general form outlined in the 
previous section, with real per capita GDP growth as the dependant variable. In keeping with 
early aid effectiveness studies, the first method used is Ordinary Least Squares. Due to the 
potential for endogeneity amongst important variables, we also use 2-Stage Least Squares at 
times, although it has generally proven difficult to find suitable instruments with countries for 
which data is so porous. As in much of the literature, our results do not differ in any 
meaningful way between these two methods, and as such we often do not report the latter. 
 
We have also used panel regressions using country and period dummies, as much of the 
recent literature has found this preferable to the previous two methods. The drawback of this 
method is the necessary exclusion of variables for which our data do not vary over time, such 
as linguistic fractionalization.  
 
Finally, GMM estimation is used as an increasingly preferred regression technique, as 
discussed in multiple works by David Roodman (2004; 2006; 2007; 2008). Within 
Roodman’s xtabond2 framework for Stata, we use the two-step efficient, dynamic system 
GMM estimator, with small sample size and Windmeijer correction options to reduce 
downward bias in coefficient estimates that can otherwise occur.12 
 
Our approach is to test the specifications of a number of prominent papers using the new, 
Small Island Developing State dataset, and the closest available variables and econometric 
methods. We then find a preferred specification that best explains the variations in the data 






The first model we test is that of Burnside and Dollar (2000), using 4-year periods and OLS, 
to investigate the hypothesis that aid is only significant in good policy environments.13 The 
specification of the model can be seen in the results in Table 1. We use as close an 
approximation as possible to the Burnside and Dollar specification as the data allows. We use 
the KKZ Stability variable in place of the unavailable assassinations variable, exclude the 
assassinations * ethnic fractionalization interaction, use the full KKZ mean as an institutional 
quality measure, and of course replace the Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia dummies with 
our own – in this case Pacific and Caribbean dummies.  
 
The first step is an OLS regression on all non-aid variables, the coefficients of which are used 
to determine the weightings of the constituent parts in creating a policy variable.14 Due to 
data unavailability, the budget surplus variable is omitted, and we create the policy index 
using just inflation, trade, and a constant. The policy index is thus given by  
ܤܦ ܲ݋݈݅ܿݕ ൌ 4.96 െ 0.021 כ ܫ݂݈݊ܽݐ݅݋݊ ൅ 0.020 כ ܶݎܽ݀݁  
The first term is the estimated constant (significant at ten per cent), allowing us to interpret 
this Burnside and Dollar policy index as the expected growth given inflation and openness. 
 
We then reintroduce aid and its interactions, including with the newly created policy variable. 
The results of these regressions are shown in Table 1, along with those of Burnside and 
Dollar (2000) and Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004), who re-test the exact specification 
using a larger dataset. In general, the results do not support the hypothesis that aid is only 
effective in good policy environments. In regression (1) our results are broadly similar to 
Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004), in that only institutional quality and policy have a 
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positive and significant effect on growth. The other variables found significant by Burnside 
and Dollar were not found to be robust to the larger Easterly, Levine and Roodman dataset, 
and these results continue here as we repeat their finding of a general lack of support for the 
policy conditionality of aid effectiveness. We also repeat these regressions with a dataset 
including only low-income countries,15 but these results yield no new findings and are not 
reported. 
 
The Medicine Model 
Here we use the Hansen and Tarp (2000) model, which builds on Burnside and Dollar’s 
framework to include squared aid variables and interactions. The model is otherwise similar, 
although each of the constituent parts of the BD Policy variable are now included separately 
in the final regression. While the budget surplus variable is unavailable for the SIDS dataset, 
a measure of government consumption is added which is available. The results are presented 
as regression (2). 
 
The main difference between our results and Hansen and Tarp is that again we do not find aid 
to be significant, either by itself or in squared or interactive terms. As before, institutional 
quality (KKZ Mean) appears to be the greatest and most significant driver of growth. Perhaps 
due to their inclusion as individual variables rather than part of an index, the policy variables 
are now also insignificant, although with the exception of financial depth (M2) they enter 
with the same sign as in Hansen and Tarp’s estimates. 
 
Conditioning on Institutions 
Collier and Dollar (2001) uses quality of institutions as a condition. While they use the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRGE) as a measure of institutional quality, these data 
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are prohibitively expensive, and as such we continue with the KKZ institutional measure. 
Further, they use the CPIA mean as a measure of policy quality but due to lack of data, we 
use the Burnside and Dollar policy variable. 
 
The main result of this model, shown in Regression 3, is weak significance of aid both by 
itself and in its interaction with the KKZ variable. This is our first indication that aid may be 
having positive benefits, with the latter implying aid is more effective when combined with 
good institutions. With these results seemingly sensitive to the specification of the model, it 
is unclear at this stage what is driving them, providing additional impetus for further 
investigation. Interestingly, the KKZ variable itself is now insignificant, an effect which is 




Table 1: Literature Specifications 
Variables BD ELR (1) HT (2) CD (3) 
Log GDP per Capita -0.60 -0.40 -0.323 -0.136  0.123  0.49 -0.096 
Linguistic Frac -0.42 -0.01 -1.378*     
Assassinations/KKZ Stab -0.45* -0.37  0.481     
Ethnic * Assassinations  0.79*  0.18      
Institutions/KKZ Mean  0.69**  0.31*  1.085**  0.675**  2.493***  0.52***   1.176 
        
M2 (Lagged)  0.012  0.00 -0.010  0.014 -0.014   
Openness / Trade      1.466  0.055 -0.22  0.017** 
Inflation    -1.338** -0.045 -0.12 -0.043** 
Budget Surplus     7.415    
Govt. Consumption    -3.832 -0.100** -0.01 -0.077** 
BD Policy  0.71**  1.22**  0.906**    0.38*  
BD Policy2     0.083 -0.130   
        
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.87** -1.68**    -0.59  
East Asia  1.31**  1.18*    3.27***  
Pacific   -1.280    -1.046 
Caribbean   -0.157     0.618 
        
ODA -0.021  0.20  -0.041   0.166**  0.073 -0.32  0.353* 
ODA2    -0.003*  0.001 -0.01 -0.007 
ODA * BD Policy  0.19** -0.15   0.009 -0.004 -0.008  0.33*** -0.036 
ODA * Institutions/KKZ      -0.10**  0.090* 
        
R2  0.36  0.33   0.27  0.38  0.33 0.36  0.32 
Adjusted  R2     0.22   0.27   0.25 
Observations  275  345   159  243  171  302  178 
*, **, *** Indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. BD = Burnside and Dollar (2000). ELR = Easterly, Levine and 
Roodman (2004). HT = Hansen and Tarp (2000). CD = Collier and Dollar (2001). 
Budget surplus in HT is actually budget deficit, meaning signs are reversed. 
In CD, Institutions/KKZ Mean is replaced by the ICRGE measure of institutions, and BD Policy is replaced by the CPIA 
Mean. CD also includes regional dummies for South Asia (2.44***), Middle East/North Africa 1.78***) and 
Europe/Central Asia (-0.48), not included for space reasons. CD and (3) also both include period dummies. 
Trade, Govt Consumption, Budget Surplus and M2 given as % of GDP, ODA as % GNI. 
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Feeny and McGillivray specification  
 
We next test the specifications used by Feeny and McGillivray (2010), which uses a SIDS 
dataset covering the years 1980 to 2004. Notable additions to the previous specifications are 
the introduction of a measure of the effect of natural disasters, which takes the value of one in 
periods in which more than ten percent of the population are affected by disasters such as 
floods and earthquakes, and zero otherwise; and two fragility variables, which take the value 
of 1 if the country is in the bottom two CPIA quintiles for the first, and the bottom CPIA 
quintile for the second, and zero otherwise. The disaster variable is easily constructed, but the 
fragility variables were made available to the authors on a confidential basis by the World 
Bank, and cannot be constructed for enough of our countries using publicly available data. As 
the fragility variables are not central to the model, we proceed without them.  
 
The authors first use a fixed effects model with an annual dataset, experimenting with 
contemporaneous and lagged variables. This is different from the 4-year and 5-year period 
norms of the literature, and our results show that it may significantly affect their results. Their 
second set of regressions use 4-year aggregated periods in a two-step GMM estimation, 
which we also use. 
 
In keeping with the traditions set out by Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004), we also test 
using both our full dataset and again using a dataset restricted only to Feeny and 
McGillivray’s listed countries and periods.16 We note that the major difference between our 
full dataset and the dataset restricted to Feeny and McGillivray’s countries appears to be that 
the former includes all country-year observations in which the country received ODA, rather 
than those that fall below some current income threshold, as well as including some countries 
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below the threshold but still excluded from their dataset. Table 2 shows results for the fixed 
effects (4 - 6) and GMM (7, 8) regressions. 
 
Regressions 4 and 5 test two annual data specifications differing only in their lag structures, 
with regressions marked ‘a’ and ‘b’ utilizing the full dataset and restricted dataset 
respectively. Regression 6 seeks to bridge the gap to the literature by using the norm of 4-
year periods, removing the need for lagged variables, and focusing the analysis on long run 
rather than short run (and potentially cyclical) relationships. 
 
We first note that the signs and magnitudes of the variables are broadly similar across each of 
these regressions and the Feeny and McGillivray counterparts, suggesting genuine 
relationships, but that they differ in their significance. Differences between regressions using 
the unrestricted and restricted datasets show the sensitivity to country and period choices. 
Given this, and our inability to accurately recreate the Feeny and McGillivray dataset, it is no 
surprise that we have been unable to recreate their results as hoped. 
 
The results are instructive, however. In particular, we note that the lag structure appears to 
greatly affect the significance of all lagged variables. Each policy variable becomes less 
significant when lagged in our annual data regressions, whereas Feeny and McGillivray see 
the same effect on trade, while inflation gains in significance. The aid variables also have 
differing results – significant when contemporaneous but much less so when lagged in our 
regressions, but insignificant when contemporaneous and significant when twice lagged for 
Feeny and McGillivray. In each case the results do not support Feeny and McGillivray’s 
findings, and we can conclude only that there is much sensitivity to the lag structure.  
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It is partly for this reason, and the desire to focus more on long run growth effects, that much 
of the literature uses 4-year periods. We note that doing so in Regression 6 yields results with 
a much higher explanatory power, and results that much better echo those of the previous 
models: institutional quality and policy appear to be significant drivers of growth, while aid 
and aid2 are more sensitive to the specification. 
 
Regression 7 uses the two-step GMM estimator discussed previously, also used in FM3.  
Again these results are unable to support those of Feeny and McGillivray, with aid and aid2 
found to be insignificant, and the sign and magnitude of the former also sensitive to the 
dataset.  
 
Overall, we cannot confirm the results of the Feeny and McGillivray estimations, even when 
restricting the dataset to those countries and periods included in their dataset.17 Using the 
fixed effect regressions, we do find the expected support for policy and institutional variables 
as significant drivers of growth, but aid appears to be dependent on the specification. As the 
results of the annual data models appear so sensitive to changes in the data set, and the 
explanatory power of these models are so low, it is unclear what exactly is driving the results, 
and we cannot claim a high level of confidence in them. As such, we proceed in favour of 
using aggregated, rather than annual, data. 
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Table 2: Feeny and McGillivray Specifications  
Variables FM1 (4a) (4b) FM3 (5a) (5b) (6) FM4 (7a)  (7b) 
Constant -2.511 -0.137 -2.611 -2.213  2.154 -3.550*   3.973** -3.208  1.067  1.674 
Institutions/KKZ Mean   0.398  2.598***  4.105***  0.665  2.193**  3.337*   4.278**  8.499*  2.912  2.800 
Disaster -1.866 -1.125* -1.466* -1.473 -0.984 -1.268  -0.304 -1.152 -0.218 -0.327 
Ethnolinguistic Frac        -0.177 -3.933 -0.889 
           
M2  -0.017 -0.075*** -0.071*** -0.012 -0.065*** -0.055*** -0.064*** -0.077  0.015 -0.018 
Trade    0.049***  0.021***  0.016*     0.023**  0.055  0.005  0.015 
Inflation -0.003 -0.026*** -0.023**    -0.033*  0.027 -0.022 -0.043 
Trade (Lagged)     0.005  0.024***  0.010     
Inflation (Lagged)     0.003** -0.015 -0.012     
           
ODA   0.0098  0.155**  0.179**     0.102  0.377** 0.123 -0.019 
ODA2 -0.002 -0.002* -0.002**    -0.000 -0.005** 0.001  0.001 
ODA (Lagged 1 period)     -0.139  0.061  0.055     
ODA2 (Lagged 1 period)     0.002 -0.000 -0.000     
ODA (Lagged 2 periods)     0.223**  0.142*  0.193*     
ODA2 (Lagged 2 periods)    -0.003*** -0.000 -0.000     
R2  --- 0.11 0.16 --- 0.09 0.09 0.23 -- -- -- 
Observations  569 787 545 561 743 509 190 124 190 153 
*, **, *** Indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Regressions (4), (5), and (6) use a FE Panel estimation, (7) uses GMM as described in text. All regressions use 
non-reported period dummies. FM = Feeny and McGillivray (2010), Regressions 1, 3 and 4. Trade, M2 given as % of GDP, ODA as % GNI
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Towards a preferred specification: The Basic Model  
 
Having tested the results of several prominent models, here we seek to combine their 
contributions to create a model that best explains the relationship between growth and foreign 
aid in SIDS. To do so, we first test numerous specifications, both new and taken from the 
literature, to determine which non-aid variables best explain growth in the dataset, and 
combine them to create a basic model.18 We then test the effectiveness of aid and its 
conditions by adding them to the basic model and observing the results.  For comparability 
with past papers, we predominantly rely on OLS estimation, although fixed effects and GMM 
results are also reported for the final results. 
 
The major variables, common to almost all other papers, are generally well behaved in these 
regressions, and the results shown in regression (8a – 8g) of Table 3 are representative of 
these behaviours. The coefficient on log of GDP is generally negative, suggesting a 
convergence effect, while the coefficients on the policy variables are also as expected, with 
trade positive, while inflation, government consumption, and M2 all negative. Trade is 
generally significant, with inflation also significant but less so. A new policy index, created 
using the same method as Burnside and Dollar (2000) but combining all four of these 
variables, adds a small amount to the predictive power of the model, and is generally more 
significant (and enters with a greater coefficient) than the Burnside and Dollar variable, 
suggesting it is a better measure of ‘good’ policy for this dataset.  
 
It is the institutional quality variables, in particular KKZ Mean and its constituent parts that 
appear to have the most consistently significant effect on growth. This effect is always 
positive and generally quite large. Using the constituent measures of KKZ, rather than the 
mean, adds little to the model except to note that they all enter with positive coefficients.  
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Attempts to incorporate a measure of volatility of aid, inspired by Guillaumont (2009), and 
Bulir and Hamann (2003; 2007), did not add significantly to the model. In general the 
coefficient was negative, as expected, but never significant. Incorporating life expectancy, 
population, domestic credit as a percentage of GDP, and migrant stock as a percentage of 
population (as a proxy for openness and knowledge transfer) all had no significant effect on 
the model. 
 
We also modify the disaster variable so that it measures the percentage of the population 
affected by disasters in any given year, rather than a dummy taking the value of one when 
this measure is above ten per cent.19 Surprisingly, neither form is a significant driver of 
growth, nor adds to the predictive power of the model. In some cases it enters positively, a 
result that leads to its exclusion, as there is no clear theoretical basis for this.  
 
The Pacific dummy also adds to the model somewhat, showing growth rates up to two per 
cent lower than the rest of the sample, while the other regional dummies add nothing and are 
thus excluded. The significance of the Pacific dummy disappears with the inclusion of 
linguistic fractionalization, however, suggesting they each capture some of the same effects. 
Including just linguistic fractionalization results in a similarly negative coefficient. This 
appears to reflect slow growth in highly fractionalized Pacific countries such as Papua New 
Guinea, Vanuatu, and the Solomon Islands, contrasted with high growth in non-Pacific 
countries with low fractionalization such as the Seychelles, St Kitts and Nevis, and St 
Vincent and the Grenadines. As the linguistic fractionalization variable is a constant, and thus 




These general results provide the basis for a model to which we can add aid and its 
interactions to determine their effectiveness. This basic model, with aid variables excluded, is 




Table 3: Preferred Specification, OLS 
Variables (8a) (8b) (8c) (8d) (8e) (8f) (8g) 
Initial GDP ‐0.651* ‐0.139 ‐0.046 ‐0.130 ‐0.026 ‐0.170 0.537 
KKZ Mean   2.604***   2.399***  2.392*** 2.380*** 1.711**  1.710**  
Linguistic Frac  ‐1.269*  ‐1.29*  ‐1.161 ‐1.264* ‐0.685 ‐0.657  ‐0.384 
         
Inflation ‐0.024 ‐0.027* ‐0.026* ‐0.027* ‐0.028* ‐0.027* ‐0.030* 
M2 ‐0.017 ‐0.017 ‐0.017 ‐0.016 ‐0.019 ‐0.018 ‐0.010 
Trade   0.015***  0.014** 0.014** 0.014** 0.015***  0.015** 0.017** 
Govt Consumption ‐0.026 ‐0.047 ‐0.056 ‐0.048 ‐0.070* ‐0.071 ‐0.097** 
       
Pacific Dummy ‐0.631 ‐0.612 ‐0.698 ‐0.606 ‐1.066 ‐1.060 ‐1.299* 
       
ODA   0.059* 0.099 0.056 0.098***  0.096** 0.120*** 
ODA2   ‐0.001      
ODA * Policy    0.002   0.018 ‐0.002 
ODA * KKZ Mean     0.098**  0.098**  0.135*** 
        
R2 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.37 0.35 
Adjusted R2  0.28 0.29  0.28 0.28 0.30 0.30  0.28
Observations 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 
*, **, *** Indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Trade, Govt Consumption, M2 given as % of GDP, 
ODA as % GNI. Period dummies not reported. 
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Towards a preferred specification: Including Aid and its Interactions 
 
We next add the aid and interaction variables successively (regressions 8b – 8g, Table 3). We 
note that aid is significant when included by itself, but loses significance when the squared 
term is introduced, suggesting some interference between the variables, presumably caused 
by their correlation20. Because of this, and due to the fact we have found little evidence for 
the medicine model, we exclude the aid squared variable.21 Aid, then, is generally found to 
have a positive and significant effect on growth in this model. The interaction of aid and 
policy is insignificant, supporting the same finding in Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004) 
and Hansen and Tarp (2000), and contrasting that of Burnside and Dollar (2000). These 
results are supported by the fixed effects estimations, although the GMM regressions are 
more volatile and find less significance for all variables.22 
  
Beyond aid itself, clearly the most significant result, and the most significant driver of 
growth, is the quality of political and social institutions, measured by the KKZ variable. The 
coefficient on the variable by itself is always large, positive, and significant, as is its 
interaction with aid. The positive coefficient on the interaction term suggests that aid is more 
effective when combined with good institutions, as was found when testing the Collier and 
Dollar (2001) model. Given the constituent parts of KKZ, there is a clear interpretation for 
this result. Interestingly, Collier and Dollar’s initial results found a negative coefficient on the 
interaction of aid and institutions, with a positive coefficient on the interaction of aid and 
policy. Again, greater data availability, particularly of other variables such as the ICRGE 
measure of institutional quality and the CPIA measures of policy, would likely help to shed 
light on these differing results. 
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Overall, this model represented by regressions 8e – 8g appear to fit the SIDS dataset more 
satisfactorily than those taken from the literature, resulting in much great R2 values.  
Although adjusted R2 values are generally not reported in the literature, they too are much 
greater for these preferred specifications, in most cases exceeding the unadjusted R2 values of 





This paper extends the methods used in existing literature to test the statistical evidence of the 
effect of aid on growth in Small Island Developing States. In general, we are able to 
satisfactorily reproduce a number of the major models from the literature, with few 
divergences when necessary, and create a preferred specification that appears to better fit the 
SIDS dataset and shed some light on aid effectiveness in these countries. 
 
Our results on aid are encouraging. We find in a number of models, including our preferred 
specification, that aid has a significant and positive effect on growth. We also find that aid 
appears to be more effective when combined with high quality institutions and social 
infrastructure, such as the rule of law, government effectiveness and accountability, and 
political stability and the absence of violence, which is a relatively clear result with a strong 
intuitive basis. On the other hand, we depart from part of the literature in finding no evidence 
that aid is more effective when combined with ‘good’ governmental policy, as defined by low 
inflation, high openness to trade, low government consumption, and low financial depth. We 
also find no substantial support for the so-called medicine model of aid effectiveness, and 
indeed exclude it from later regressions. 
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These differences suggest that the conditionality and overall effectiveness of Official 
Development Assistance differs significantly between the Small Island Developing States 
and the general, all-inclusive datasets used in previous studies. For donors, particularly those 
such as New Zealand and Australia, who primarily focus their development aid on countries 
within our dataset, this could have strong implications. The results may suggest optimal 
reallocation of aid to those countries with strong institutions, and perhaps the use of aid to 
incentivize development of these institutions in countries where they are weak, in order to 
increase both aid effectiveness and the direct growth effects of strong institutions. 
 
These results show the underlying importance of considering distinct groups of countries, or 
even individual countries, when making investigations of this nature. While many studies 
find strong results over large datasets, these results cannot necessarily be generalized to all 
countries, whether included in the study or not. This shows a need for expansion of the aid 
effectiveness literature not just to new models and larger datasets, but also to smaller and 
more specific datasets. Different countries, and groups of countries with unifying 
characteristics, evidently have different drivers of growth and reactions to development aid, 
with strong implications for optimal aid spending and allocation. These results for Small 
Island Developing States clearly exemplify this idea.
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Appendix 
Table A1: Countries and Summary Data 
ODA / GNI Growth of GDP per capita ODA / GNI GDP/Cap Corr 
Mean Std Dev Min Max Mean Std Dev Min Max 1980 2008 1980 2008  
Antigua and Barbuda  1.72 1.47  0.22  7.38 4.23 4.68 ‐6.68 15.07  5.05 0.72 3757 11651 0.2206
Aruba  2.17 1.88  ‐0.54  7.88 4.36 7.95 ‐19.98 20.15  2.47 ‐0.54 6769 18505 0.6597
The Bahamas  0.14 0.13  0.02  0.57 1.18 4.29 ‐11.18 11.81  0.16 0.08 15152 18264 0.4855
Bahrain  1.83 1.80  ‐0.08  6.08 1.58 4.67 ‐10.78 9.28  5.28 0.54 11479 16968 ‐0.2892
Barbados  0.42 0.57  ‐0.09  1.81 0.88 3.95 ‐5.55 8.90  1.66 0.02 7812 10432 ‐0.0449
Belize  4.96 2.99  0.79  11.00 3.13 4.61 ‐4.06 12.14  7.52 2.11 1981 3691 0.1750
Cape Verde  27.41 10.63  12.66  49.64 3.74 3.11 ‐2.32 10.15  43.63 14.72 624 1739 ‐0.0647
Comoros  20.03 10.87  5.92  41.59 0.63 3.01 ‐7.84 6.26  34.84 7.01 405 370 0.0611
Cuba  0.20 0.04  0.11  0.32 1.67 7.15 ‐15.37 19.09  0.23 0.21 2406 4370 0.0085
Dominica  11.71 6.21  4.06  29.65 4.65 3.68 ‐4.01 13.25  29.65 6.18 1839 4433 0.5108
Dominican Republic  1.06 0.95  ‐0.02  4.38 2.44 3.85 ‐7.37 9.07  1.94 0.35 1777 3623 ‐0.4343
Fiji  2.68 0.87  1.28  4.92 1.10 4.37 ‐8.38 7.96  3.03 1.28 1838 2276 0.0821
Grenada  7.53 6.90  1.96  30.19 3.28 4.88 ‐6.74 12.48  4.73 5.22 1870 4787 0.2174
Guinea‐Bissau  45.58 14.62  22.78  78.71 ‐0.25 8.05 ‐29.63 15.31  55.46 29.53 137 142 ‐0.0513
Guyana  18.54 13.07  6.32  61.17 1.70 4.86 ‐13.23 8.11  7.44 14.46 804 1104 0.3219
Haiti  10.14 5.94  5.03  31.39 ‐1.92 3.82 ‐13.69 7.75  7.59 13.53 657 385 0.0578
Jamaica  3.10 2.86  ‐0.26  9.20 0.90 3.28 ‐6.99 8.61  5.11 0.57 2720 3824 ‐0.0233
Kiribati  25.85 12.26  10.99  50.06 ‐0.51 9.89 ‐45.57 15.74  50.06 13.47 720 779 ‐0.4119
Maldives  10.29 7.62  3.22  41.05 6.75 14.30 ‐8.46 76.76  41.05 4.49 560 3437 ‐0.2185
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Table A1: Countries and Summary Data (cont.) 
 ODA / GNI Growth of GDP per capita ODA / GNI GDP/Cap Corr 
 Mean Std Dev Min Max Mean Std Dev Min Max 1980 2008 1980 2008  
Marshall Islands  35.48  14.73 0.29 56.98 0.46 5.99  ‐15.82 13.94 0.29 28.96 1940 2159 ‐0.2726 
Mauritius  1.80  1.49 ‐0.25 5.29 3.76 3.56  ‐11.42 8.81 2.97 1.16 1573 4839 0.0563 
Micronesia, Fed. States of  37.19  13.55 0.24 57.51 0.94 4.31  ‐6.92 13.40 0.24 34.50 1669 2035 ‐0.3438 
New Caledonia  13.19  3.49 8.70 22.08 0.78 6.56  ‐7.65 32.11 16.74 8.91 9908 11346 0.0025 
Palau  45.30  59.36 0.01 242.29 0.19 4.99  ‐14.40 8.05 0.01 23.48 5899 6312 0.4867 
Papua New Guinea  9.22  2.85 3.84 13.91 0.20 4.98  ‐6.47 15.15 13.09 3.84 650 681 ‐0.2602 
Samoa  18.62  7.58 7.03 35.07 2.29 3.14  ‐5.08 6.51 19.46 7.03 1127 1925 ‐0.5376 
São Tomé and Príncipe  33.76  19.21 4.42 91.58 ‐0.26 4.65  ‐12.20 9.67 4.42 26.49 917 876 0.1832 
Seychelles  5.90  4.50 0.91 15.14 1.57 5.18  ‐9.24 10.66 15.14 1.47 4532 8092 ‐0.1113 
Singapore  0.07  0.08 ‐0.01 0.30 4.58 3.96  ‐5.00 10.67 0.12 0.01 9043 30031 0.1446 
Solomon Islands  22.69  11.84 7.45 47.77 0.39 9.72  ‐16.56 37.85 41.29 40.68 1387 1140 0.1053 
St Kitts and Nevis  4.63  3.37 0.01 13.27 4.00 4.13  ‐2.32 12.97 13.27 8.26 2934 8794 0.3129 
St Lucia  4.23  2.46 ‐2.92 9.25 3.05 7.12  ‐12.32 21.79 6.58 2.10 2121 4988 ‐0.0281 
St Vincent and the Grenadines  6.87  4.47 1.00 18.70 3.80 3.66  ‐3.04 13.92 16.33 4.79 1362 4440 ‐0.0509 
Suriname  6.05  4.99 0.39 20.07 0.02 4.85  ‐14.77 8.58 9.31 3.71 2536 2623 ‐0.0196 
Tonga  17.93  6.27 7.13 28.69 2.03 2.56  ‐2.71 7.31 26.06 7.28 1253 2034 0.3038 
Trinidad and Tobago  0.17  0.22 ‐0.10 0.76 1.96 5.67  ‐10.83 14.04 0.07 0.05 6925 10909 ‐0.2621 
Vanuatu  21.01  9.88 10.38 45.88 0.49 5.09  ‐13.77 11.21 45.88 14.95 1092 1539 ‐0.2097 
GDP/cap is per capita GDP in Constant 2000 $US. Corr is simple correlation between ODI / GNI and Growth of GDP per Capita. Growth and ODA / GNI given as percentages. In some cases, 
2008 or 1980 data is unavailable, in which case the closest available year is used.
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Table A2: Variable Descriptions 
Variables Description Source Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Growth Per capita GDP growth, in constant local currency. 
World Bank World Development 
Indicators (WDI), UNstats (UN), 
Penn World Tables (PWT) 
1.851 5.041 -16.564 21.794 
Aid, ODA 
Net Official Development Assistance Received, as % 
of GNI. 
WDI 11.664 13.420 -2.920 67.330 
Initial GDP 
Per capita GDP at the beginning of each period, in 
2000 US$. (Logarithm used in regressions). 
WDI, PWT, UN 3771 3925 139 20359 
       
Linguistic             
    Fractionalization 
Probability two people selected at random are of 
different ethnolinguistic groups. 
Lewis, M.P. Ethnologue 
Ethnologue.com 
0.355 0.356 0.000 0.990 
Disaster 
Population affected by disasters, as defined by the 
WHO Emergencies and Natural Disaster Database, as 
% of total population from WDI. (Note: can exceed 1 
as multiple disasters summated for each period) 
WHO, WDI 0.022 0.108 0.000 153.302 
Institutions       
KKZ Mean 
Kauffman, Kraay, Zoido (KKZ) mean of 6 measures 
of institutional quality. 
World Bank World Governance 
Indicators (WGI) 
0.084 0.536 -1.586 1.524 
KKZ Stab KKZ Political Stability and Absence of Violence WGI 0.500 0.674 -1.960 1.479 
KKZ Voice KKZ Voice and Accountability WGI 0.374 0.749 -2.186 1.457 
KKZ Govt KKZ Government Effectiveness WGI -0.150 0.708 -2.506 2.598 
KKZ Reg KKZ Regulatory Quality WGI -0.121 0.683 -2.659 1.656 
KKZ Law KKZ Rule of Law WGI -0.075 0.745 -1.883 1.710 
KKZ Corr KKZ Control of Corruption WGI -0.023 0.699 -1.738 2.231 
ICRGE 
International Country Risk Guide political, economic 
and financial risk ratings, used by several studies. 
Unavailable     
Assassinations Various measures of political and civil unrest. Unavailable     
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Notes: All data represents annual data, except those for BD Policy which is only calculated for 4-year data. Those country-years determined as outliers by the Hadi method 
for aid and per capita growth are excluded. Because of the summation of multiple disasters in some country-years, the disaster variable can exceed 100% of the population. 
This maximum is an extreme outlier.
Table A2: Variable Descriptions, cont. 
Variables Description Source Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Policy       
M2 
Money and quasi money (M2), as % of GDP. Proxy 
for financial depth/development. 
WDI, International Financial 
Statistics 
54.471 26.811 11.880 145.435 
Trade 
Value of Exports + Imports, as % of GDP. 
Alternative to various ‘openness’ variables, such as 
the unavailable Sash-Warner coefficient. 
WDI, PWT, IMFStats 111.506 52.194 6.780 398.954 
Inflation CPI Inflation, annual %. 
WDI, IMF World Economic 
Outlooks 
9.139 19.138 -11.449 368.478 
Budget Surplus Govt budget surplus, as % of GDP. Unavailable -1.707 5.633 -14.963 21.229 
Govt. Consumption 
General Govt final consumption expenditure, as % of 
GDP. 
WDI 19.826 8.332 3.219 83.159 
BD Policy (initial) 
Burnside and Dollar style policy variable, constructed 
as coefficient-weighted mean of trade, inflation, and a 
constant, as described in the text. 
Constructed 7.069 1.149 2.320 12.122 
BD Policy (new) 
Burnside and Dollar style policy variable, constructed 
as coefficient-weighted mean of trade, inflation, govt. 
consumption, M2 and a constant, as described in the 
text. 
Constructed 1.601 1.835 -3.762 10.240 
CPIA Mean 
World Bank Country Policy and Institutions 
Assessment ranking. Mean of 16 measures, used in 
several studies. 
     
       
Unreported       
Population Total population (thousands) WDI 1338 2588 15.969 11200 
Life expectancy Life expectancy at birth. WDI 66.8 6.9 40.6 78.7 
       




Table A3: Burnside and Dollar Policy Variable Regression 
Variables BD(2000)   A1 
Initial GDP  ‐0.65    Initial GDP  ‐0.492 
Ethnolinguistic Frac  ‐0.58    Linguistic Fractionalization  ‐1.423* 
Assassinations  ‐0.44*    KKZ Stab   0.568 
Ethnic x Assassinations  0.81*       
         
Institutional Quality  0.64**    KKZ Mean   1.037 
         
M2 (Lagged)  0.015    M2 (Lagged)  ‐0.010 
Budget Surplus   6.85**       
Inflation  ‐1.40**    Inflation  ‐0.021 
Openness (Sachs‐Warner)  2.16**    Trade  0.020*** 
         
Sub‐Saharan Africa  ‐1.53**    Pacific  ‐1.192* 
East Asia  0.89    Caribbean  ‐0.102 
         
R2  0.35      0.27 
Adjusted R2        0.22 
Observations  275      159 
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 




Table A4: Preferred Specification, FE and GMM 
Variables (A2a) (A2b) (A2c) (A2d)  (A3a) (A3b) (A3c) (A3d)
Initial GDP ‐0.613 ‐0.337 ‐0.404 0.356  ‐1.276 ‐1.913 ‐0.442 0.364
KKZ Mean   3.261*   2.418 2.718*  3.366  4.300  0.250
Linguistic Frac.    
     
Inflation  ‐0.045**  ‐0.038** ‐0.045** ‐0.040* ‐0.056  ‐0.045 ‐0.080 ‐0.041
M2 ‐0.056** ‐0.045** ‐0.053** ‐0.042  ‐0.024 ‐0.072 ‐0.076 ‐0.074
Trade  0.037**  0.039** 0.035** 0.029*  0.019 0.035 0.062 0.032
Govt Consumption ‐0.101 ‐0.096 ‐0.104 ‐0.098*  ‐0.112 0.026 ‐0.150 ‐0.209
       
Pacific Dummy      1.341 ‐1.737 ‐2.974 0.079
     
ODA  0.137**  0.133** 0.154** 0.167**  0.032 0.091 0.265 0.143
ODA2      
ODA * Policy ‐0.019  ‐0.018 ‐0.009  0.016 ‐0.031 ‐0.013
ODA * KKZ Mean   0.084** 0.079  0.146   0.080 0.261 0.158
          
Prob > chi‐squared / F 0.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.051 0.007 0.000 0.000
R2  .24  .29 .28 .36  
Observations 171 171 171 171  171 171 171 171
*, **, *** Indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Trade, Govt Consumption, M2 given as % of GDP, ODA as % GNI. 




Table A5: Preferred Specification, OLS (including ODA2) 
Variables (8a) (8b) (8c) (8d) (8e) (8f) (8g) 
Initial GDP ‐0.651* ‐0.139 ‐0.046 ‐0.040 ‐0.166 ‐0.155 0.247 
KKZ Mean   2.604***  2.399***  2.392***  2.391*** 1.558* 1.554*  
Linguistic Frac ‐1.269*  ‐1.29* ‐1.161 ‐1.141 ‐0.778 ‐0.737 ‐0.545 
       
Inflation ‐0.024 ‐0.027* ‐0.026* ‐0.026 ‐0.029** ‐0.029* ‐0.032** 
M2 ‐0.017 ‐0.017 ‐0.017 ‐0.016 ‐0.019 ‐0.018 ‐0.011 
Trade   0.015*** 0.014** 0.014**  0.014** 0.016*** 0.015** 0.017** 
Govt Consumption ‐0.026 ‐0.047 ‐0.056 ‐0.057** ‐0.059 ‐0.061 ‐0.077* 
     
Pacific Dummy ‐0.631 ‐0.612 ‐0.698 ‐0.693 ‐1.020 ‐1.010 ‐1.188* 
     
ODA  0.059* 0.099  0.098 0.035 0.032 0.018 
ODA2   ‐0.001  0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 
ODA * Policy    ‐0.001  0.002 ‐0.004 
ODA * KKZ Mean     0.121** 0.121** 0.167*** 
        
R2 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.37 0.36 
Adjusted R2  0.28  0.29 0.28 0.28  0.30 0.30 0.28 
Observations 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 
*, **, *** Indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Trade, Govt Consumption, M2 given as % of GDP, ODA as % GNI. 






1 All aid data are taken from the World Bank World Development Indicators and SourceOECD databases. See 
Table A1 for summary aid data. 
2 A full list of countries to be used can be found in Table A1. 
3 ODA must be official aid intended for development purposes, and includes pure donations as well as loans 
with a grant element of at least 25%, at a fixed discount rate of 10%. It includes debt relief plans, which reduces 
the accuracy of the data for analyses such as this by adding a delay between receipt of funds and appearance in 
ODA statistics. It does not exclude tied aid nor aid in the form of technical co-operation. By definition, it is only 
received by countries meeting certain DAC ‘least developed’ criteria, but in some cases we include the 
equivalent, Official Aid, for countries who have recently been removed from the list of such least developed 
countries. 
4 While a panel of existing indicators such as the UNDP’s Human Development Index, life expectancy, infant 
mortality, educational rates, measures of human rights, and so on, would be of some use in an analysis such as 
this, the stock of such data for these countries is so porous that any analysis would be econometrically weak. 
5 See Hadjimichael et al (2005), Lesink and White (2001), Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), Hansen and Tarp 
(2000; 2001), Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp (2004), Feeny and McGillivray (2010), Collier and Dollar (2002), 
Clemens, Radalet and Bhavnani (2004), and incorporated in a slightly modified form into Burnside and Dollar 
(2000; 2004; and their extensions) and Murphy and Tresp (2006), among others. 
6 See also Guillaumont and Chauvet (2004), Murphy and Tresp (2006); Roodman (2004; 2008), Feeny and 
McGillivray (2010), and Rajan and Subramanian (2005; 2008). 
7 Exceptions include Pavlov and Sugden (2006), and Rao, Sharma and Singh (2007), however the former 
focuses on just seven Pacific countries, while the later develops a growth model that is too divergent from the 
core aid effectiveness literature to provide any sort of results comparability. 
8 For robustness, we tested the effects of aggregating using a moving average, rather than the traditional method, 
as well as with periods of various lengths. None of these results were particularly instructive, and as such we 
keep with the usual methods used in the literature, where the norm is 4-year periods. 
9 One result of this is the inclusion of countries such as Singapore, which are generally now considered anything 
but ‘developing’, however this is necessary to remove the bias mentioned, and only years in which they were 
listed as ODA recipients are included. 
10 We also exclude country-years for which the data is a significant outlier, as determined by the Hadi method 
for multivariate samples using our aid and growth variables. These 13 outliers include events such as Kiribati’s 
1980 post-independence adjustment of high aid and extremely high negative growth, years of extremely high aid 
and low growth in 1994-1998 post-independence Palau, and Guinea-Bissau’s 1998 attempted coup and civil 
war. Outliers are also excluded from 4-year aggregations. 
11 In fact, the KKZ Stability variable may be a better measure of what the assassinations variable intends to 
capture. 
12 This is designed to be appropriate for small T, large N panels with linear functional relationships; inclusion of 
variables which are endogenous, particularly through correlation with their own past and future values; use of a 
dependent variable that is potentially correlated with its past values; inclusion of fixed individual effects; and 
possible presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within individuals. 
13 Burnside and Dollar also use 2SLS, but note little difference in its results. I also test using both methods, 
using the same instruments as Burnside and Dollar, with the exception of the unavailable arms imports variable. 
As our results are also unaffected, we do not report these extra regressions. 
14 Full results of this regression are reported in Table A3 of the appendix.  
This is later re-estimated when using different time-horizons and aggregation methods, but the full regressions 
are not re-reported. 
15 Defined here as having per capita GDP less than US$10,000 (Constant 2000 Dollars) in any given period 
16 When restricted to their listed countries and periods, the dataset still has more observations than their full 
dataset. Without access to their dataset, we are unable to see where the gaps are, and thus unable to remove 
those observances. While this is clearly not ideal, and likely accounts for many of the differences between their 
results and my ‘restricted’ dataset results, there is no way around this and I must proceed with the restricted 
dataset as is. 
17 Again it is important to emphasize that our restricted dataset is not identical to Feeny and 
McGillivray’s. See note 17. 
18 For space reasons we present only the final model, without the numerous intermediate test specifications. 
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19 Due to simple summation of number affected in the case of multiple disasters, there are several data-points 
that have a percentage slightly above 100. 
20 Roodman (2008) explores this issue at length, arguing that proliferation of interaction variables, particularly 
the aid squared term, causes multicollinearity and can, in some cases, magnify endogeneity effects and lead to 
invalid results. 
21 For comparison, the results including the aid-squared variable are in Table A5 in the appendix. We note the 
decreased significance of aid whenever aid squared is included. 
22These results are presented in Appendix Table A4, with Regression A2 representing fixed effects regressions 
and A3 representing the two-step GMM regressions.  
Interactions with other variables, such as the disaster variable, population, per capita GDP, life expectancy, 
KKZ Voice and Accountability, and the Pacific Dummy are insignificant and sensitive to specification, and thus 
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